ADR and the NLRA: Will the Board Defer? by Sadler, Judith B.
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JUDrm B. SADLER*
The National Labor Relations Board ("Board") has, for many years,
recognized the use of arbitratiof agreements to resolve disputes, even if those
disputes involve alleged violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
when the arbitrations occur in the union setting.1 However, despite its long
standing reliance on the use of mandatory arbitration to encourage the voluntary
settlement of labor disputes between an employer and a union or an employer
and "union-represented" employees, the Board has seemingly adopted a contrary
position with respect to the use of mandatory arbitration to resolve disputes
between employers and employees who are not represented by a union.2
This article examines the Board's policy of deferral to arbitration in the
context of a private employer-union relationship, a brief history of the Supreme
Court's views on arbitration, and the Board's opposition to the use of mandatory
arbitration agreements in the context of a private employer-employee relationship
in which the employee is not represented by a union. The article will conclude
with some practical and legal considerations involved in using mandatory
arbitration to resolve alleged violations of the NLRA when the employee is not
represented by a union. Finally, this article will argue that the Board should agree
to recognize the use of mandatory arbitration agl-eements by employers in a "non-
union" setting.3
* Judith Sadler practices labor and employment law in Houston, Texas. She is board
certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization in Labor and Employment Law. She is
a partner with the firm of Sadler & Sykes, L.L.P. Ms. Sadler would like to thank Suzanne
Roberts for her assistance in researching this article.
United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 558 (1984) ("Arbitration as a means
of resolving labor disputes has gained widespread acceptance over the years and now
occupies a respected and firmly established place in Federal labor policy.").
2 The Board has not yet directly ruled on whether the use of mandatory arbitration
agreements by non-union employers violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
However, in three recent decisions, the General Counsel and administrative law judges
concluded that mandatory agreements impermissibly waived the employee's rights under
section 7 of the NLRA. Exceptional Prof'l, Inc., Nos. 17-CA-19272, 17-CA-19325, 17-CA-
19385, 1998 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 563, at *1 (Aug. 5, 1998); Architectural Bldg. Products, Inc.,
No. 17-CA-19326, 1998 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 541, at *1 (July 28, 1998); Bentley's Luggage
Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice Memorandum Rep. (CCII)
34028, at 212 (Aug. 21, 1995), available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS 92 (1995); FRED
F INsiEw, NLRB GEN. CouNs. REP., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at E-6 to E-7 (Feb. 23,
1996).
3 Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees the following:
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I. THE BoARD's DEFERRAL DoCTRiNE4
The Board has, over the last forty-five years, strived to fulfill the obligations
imposed by section 10(a) of the Act to prevent unfair labor practices while
simultaneously promoting the federal labor policy advancing arbitration as a
means to resolve disputes.5
To satisfy both objectives, the Board fashioned a policy pursuant to which
it "defers" its investigation of allegations that arguably constitute unfair labor
practices until such time as the parties avail themselves of the grievance and
arbitration procedures upon which they have agreed. After the arbitration, the
Board reviews the arbitration process and the decision of the arbitrator and
decides whether to proceed with an investigation and prosecution of the unfair
labor practice charge. If the arbitration process and the decision of the arbitrator
satisfy the standards enunciated by the Board, then the Board will defer to the
arbitration and dismiss the charge.
A. Post-Arbitration Review of Arbitration Awards
In 1955, the Board formulated its policy for review of arbitral awards in
unfair labor practice cases in Spielberg Manufacturing Co.6 This policy, which
became known as the Spielberg doctrine, addressed the situation in which the
parties have already arbitrated the dispute, and the Board is faced with reviewing
the ultimate decision.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized by section 8(a)(3) [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994)].
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). The NLRA, and any violations of it, is not limited situations in
which employees are represented by a labor organization.
4 The Board uses the term "deferral" in both the pre and post arbitration context.
5 Section 10(a) of the NLRA specifically empowers the Board to
[P]revent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in
section 8 [section 158 of this title]) affecting commerce. This power shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law or otherwise ....
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1994).
6 Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
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In Spielberg, the parties agreed to arbitrate the employer's refusal to reinstate
four employees who had gone out on strike and who were accused of picket-line
misconduct.7 The arbitration was heard by a three-member panel, which was
selected pursuant to the terms set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. 8
The collective bargaining agreement also provided that the parties would be
bound by the decision of the panel majority. 9 After a hearing in which three of
the four strikers testified, a majority of the panel concluded that the employer did
not have to reinstate the four employees. 10 Following the arbitration, the four
individuals filed unfair labor practice charges, and the General Counsel issued
a complaint.'1 The admiiistrative law judge" (AlJ) rejected the employer's
affirmative defense that it could rely on the arbitration decisi6n to justify its
refusal to reinstate the strikers. He held that the employer violated the Act and
ordered that the employer reinstate the strikers. 12
On review of the employer's exceptions to the AJ's Intermediate Report,
the Board dismissed the complaint and found that the employer did not violate
the NLRA when, consistent with the arbitration award, it refused to reinstate the
four strikers. 13 In reaching this conclusion, the Board observed that all the parties
had acquiesced in the arbitration proceeding and agreed to be bound by the
decision, that the proceedings were fair and regular, and that the decision of the
panel was not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act.14 Given
the circumstances, the Board found that "the desirable objective of encouraging
the voluntary settlement of labor disputes [would] best be served by [its]
recognition of the arbitrators' award." 15 These standards became known as "the
Spielberg deferral doctrine." The Board later modified the Spielberg doctrine in
Raytheon Co. by adding a requirement that the issues involved in the unfair labor
practice case must be presented to and considered by the arbitrator. 16
Unfortunately, the vagrancies of this later modification resulted in an
inconsistent application of the doctrine.







14 Id. at 1086.
15 Id. at 1082.
16 Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 886 (1963).
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Almost twenty years later, in Olin Corp.,17 the Board finally clarified its
Raytheon Co. modification of the Spielberg doctrine. In Olin Corp., the Board
held that it would find that an arbitrator had "adequately considered the unfair
labor practice [if] the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor
practice issue, and if the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant
to resolving the unfair labor practice." 18 The Board further noted that the
arbitrator's award does not need to be totally consistent with Board precedent. 19
Unless the award is "palpably wrong," which the Board defined as a "decision
that is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act," the Board will
defer to the arbitration award.20 The Board also placed the burden on the party
objecting to deferral to establish that the Spielberg standards were not met.21
B. Pre-Arbitration Deferral to Arbitration Procedure
Consistent with its policy of post-arbitration deferral, the Board, in 1971,
adopted specific criteria for pre-arbitral deferral to the parties'
grievance/arbitration procedures.
In the seminal case of Collyer Insulated Wire,22 the Board was faced with
a claim by the employer that the union's section 8(a)(5) charge alleging a refusal
to bargain and unilateral changes in the conditions of employment should be
deferred to the grievance and arbitrations procedures of the collective bargaining
agreement. A majority of the Board held that the Board should and would defer
to the existing grievance and arbitrations procedures of the collective bargaining
agreement.
The Board articulated several reasons to favor deferral to the parties'
grievance/arbitration procedures. These reasons included (1) that the dispute
arose within the "confines of a long and productive collective bargaining
relationship;" (2) that there was no claim of employer animosity to the
employee's exercise of protected rights; (3) that the parties contract provided for
arbitration of a very broad range of disputes; (4) that the arbitration clause clearly
17 Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).




22 Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). Collyer Insulated Wire involved
allegations by the union that the employer had violated section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1994), of the NLRA by failing to bargain with the union over changes in conditions of
employment. The employer contended that the charge should be deferred to the existing
grievance and arbitration procedures in the collective bargaining agreement.
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encompassed the dispute at issue; (5) that the employer had agreed to utilize
arbitration to resolve the dispute; and (6) that the dispute was "eminently well
suited to resolution by arbitration," 23 The various courts of appeal as well as the
Supreme Court endorsed the Board's deferral policy.24
As with Spielberg, the Board modified and refined its policy of pre-arbitral
deferral and expanded its application to cases involving various allegations of
section 8(a) of the NLRA.25 In 1984, the Board reaffirmed its intent to follow
Collyer Insulated Wire when it issued its decision in United Technologies
Corp.26
I. TBE SUPREME COURT'S APPROVAL OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
In 1925, Congress, in response to pressure from the business community
adopted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).27 The FAA gained new life in 1947
when it was reenacted to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
23 Id.
24 R. W. Page Corp., 219 N.L.R.B. 268, 268 (1975); Arnold Co. v. Carpenters, 417
U.S. 12, 16-17 (1974).
25 Subsequent cases have found deferral pursuant to Collyer Insulated Wire appropriate
when the charge alleged a violation of section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994),
interfering with restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed
under section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994), and section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994),
of the NLRA discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
E.g., United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984); Machinists v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 237 (2d
Cir. 1975); Nat'l Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972); United Aircraft Corp., 204 N.L.R.B.
879 (1972).
26 The Board overruled General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977), in
United Technologies Corp., finding that the decision in General Am Transp. Corp.
"essentially emasculated the Board's deferral policy, a policy that had favorably withstood
the tests of judicial scrutiny and of practical application" for largely unsupportable reasons.
United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 559.
27 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1925). Section 2 of the FAA states the following:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction... or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such contract, transaction, or refusal shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
agreements ... to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other
contracts. 28 Despite Congress' apparent intent to promote arbitration, the
Supreme Court did not really embrace the system until much later.29
A. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 30
In its 1974 decision, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an
unsuccessful arbitration of a race discrimination claim precluded the plaintiff
from subsequently bringing suit on the claim in court. The Court reviewed the
legislative history of Title VII and concluded that Congress intended that
individuals have the right to pursue their claims under both Title VII and other
applicable statutes. 31 Furthermore, the Court held that the arbitration agreement
limited the arbitrator's authority to resolve the dispute to interpreting the
contract. In the Court's view, the arbitrator did not have the authority to interpret
the employee's statutory rights.32
Finally, the Court held that the Union could not waive an employee's Title
VII rights in a collective bargaining agreement. 33 The Supreme Court went on
to question the arbitration process as well as the qualification and ability of non-
lawyer labor arbitrations to decide statutory issues. 34
28 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
29 This paper does not attempt to fully outline the course taken by Supreme Court in
addressing the use of arbitration as a means of alternative dispute resolution. Rather, the
reader is merely provided with a short history of certain key cases that reflect the Supreme
Court's changing attitudes towards the use of mandatory arbitration agreements. Additional
cases in which the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the applicability of arbitration
agreements include Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express., Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Michigan, 466 U.S. 284
(1984); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
30 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
31 Id. at 48.
32 Id. at 53-54.
33 Id. at 52.
34 Id. at 56-57.
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B. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 35
About ten years later, in Mitsubishi Motors, Corp., the Supreme Court
embraced the liberal federal policy encouraging the use of the arbitration to
resolve disputes. The Court reviewed an -arbitration agreement by a car
dealership and held that the antitrust claims in the underlying suit were arbitrable
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.36 The Court specifically stated: "[W]e
find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every contract within its
ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims.... [Tihe Act simply
'creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to
honor an agreement to arbitrate.' '37
The Court then established a two-prong test for determining whether a
dispute is subject to arbitration. Under this test,-a court must first determine
whether the parties intended to arbitrate the subject of the dispute.38 Any doubt
concerning the scope of arbitrability must be resolved in favor of arbitration,
regardless of whether the problem was the construction of the contract-language
or allegations of defenses such as waiver or delay.39
Then, the court must determine whether, based on the statutory text and the
legislative history, Congress intended to preclude the waiver of the right to a
judicial forum.40 If both prongs of this test are met, then the agreement to
arbitrate should be upheld.
C. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.41
In 1991, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. In Gilmer, the Supreme Court specifically stated
that in an employment context "statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement, enforceable-pursuant to the FAA."42 However, the Court
sidestepped the issue of whether the FAA applied to employment -contracts,
holding that the issue was not properly before the Court because the arbitration
35 Mitsubislhi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
3 6 Id. at 625.
3 7 Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. V. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25
n.32 (1983)).
38 Id. at 626.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 628.
41 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
421d. at 26.
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clause being enforced was not contained in a contract of employment.43 Rather,
it was part of the securities registration agreement, which Gilmer was required
to sign before working in the industry.
In the years following this decision, the courts that have upheld the validity
of these agreements as mechanisms to resolve statutory and contractual claims
between private employers, and individuals in the non-union setting have
required that the agreements comply with certain standards of procedural fairness
and due process.44
D. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp.45
In 1998, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of arbitration agreements as
part of a collective bargaining agreement. In Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv.
Corp., the Supreme Court acknowledged the tension between its earlier decisions
of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.; however, the Court drew a distinction between compulsory arbitration
provisions in an individual's employment contract and provisions contained in
a collective bargaining agreement.
In Wright, the Court faced the question of whether an employee could be
required to use the arbitration procedure for an alleged violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),46 because of a general
arbitration clause in a collective-bargaining agreement. The Court held that an
employee's statutory rights are not waived by an arbitration provision in the
collective bargaining agreement unless the waiver is "clear and unmistakable."47
E. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams 48
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme Court granted Circuit
City's petition for a writ of certiorari to determine whether the Ninth Circuit
43 Id. at 25 n.2.
44 For a general discussion, see Judith B. Sadler, Mandatory Arbitration: Recent
Developments After Gilmer in the Evolving Area of Dispute Resolution Through the Use of
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, A.B.A. 1999 Annual Meeting, at
http:llwww.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/99/speech/pdf.
4 5 Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
46 42 U.S.C. § 12101-213 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
47 Id. at 80.
48 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. 99-1379, 2001 WL 273205, at *1 (U.S. Mar.
21, 2001).
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erred in holding, directly contrary to the holding of every other United States
court of appeals, that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply to contracts of
employment.49
On March 21, 2001, in a five to four decision, a majority of the Court
concluded that the Ninth Circuit had erred and that the FAA does apply to
employment contracts. The majority, led by Justice Kennedy, held that the
FAA's section 1 exemption should be narrowly construed and applies only to
"contracts of employment of transportation workers." 50 Additionally, the
majority reiterated the Court's holding in Gilmer that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate
a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum."5 1
II. THE BoARD's OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF
MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
To date, the Board has not ruled directly on whether mandatory arbitration
agreements that require employees to submit all employment disputes to
arbitration violate an employee's rights under section 7 of the NLRA.52
However, three cases in which complaints were issued by the General Counsel
provide a strong indication of the direction likely to be taken by the Board.
A. Bentley's Luggage Corp.53
In 1994, Bentley's Luggage Corporation, a non-union company, adopted a
nationwide policy that required all then current employees to sign an arbitration
agreement. The agreement provided that the employees submit any disputes
regarding their employment or the termination of their employment to binding
arbitration by a neutral third party, pursuant to the terms of the American
Arbitration Association. 54 Employees who refused to sign the policy were
terminated. Thus, when employee Allen Letwin refused to sign the agreement,
49 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999).
50 Circuit City, 2001 WL 273205, at *3. ,
51 Id. at *10 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.,20,26 (1991)).
52 See supra note 2.
53 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) 34028, at 212 (Aug. 21, 1995), available at 1995 N.L.R.B.
GCM LEXIS 92 (1995).
54 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 212, available at 1995 NLRB GCM LEXIS, at *1-2.
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his employment was terminated.55 He subsequently filed unfair labor practice
charges with the Board.56
After the charge was filed, the Regional Director for Region 12 of the Board
submitted the following questions to the Division of Advice: 57
(1) whether the Employer violated Section 8(a)(1), (3) and (4) of
the Act by requiring employees and applicants to sign an agreement
requiring employees to submit their employment claims to binding
arbitration and pay a portion of the costs before they seek redress
from any other forum concerning employment issues or termination;
(2) whether the Employer unlawfully discharged the Charging
Party [Letwin] because he refused to sign such an arbitration
agreement. 58
Upon review, the Division of Advice determined that, absent settlement, the
Region should issue a complaint against the employer and allege that the
employer violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) by maintaining the agreement and
by discharging Letwin for refusing to sign the agreement. 59
In defense of the unfair labor practice charge, Bentley's Luggage Corp.
argued that the agreement was lawful under the Supreme Court's decision in
Gilmer. The General Counsel rejected this defense on several levels.
First, the General Counsel noted that the with respect to individual contracts
of employment, the NLRA authorizes the Board "to treat individual contracts of
employment, when used to frustrate the exercise of statutory rights, as either void
or voidable. ' 60 Under the General Counsel's analysis, the arbitration agreement
used by Bentley's Luggage Corp. required employees to waive their right to file
55 /d., available at 1995 NLRB GCM LEXIS, at *3.
56 Id. Letwin also filed a charge with the EEOC and a civil suit under Florida law. Id.
57 The Office of the General Counsel consists of four main divisions, including the
Division of Advice. This division is supervised by an Associate General Counsel and
oversees the functions of legal advice to regional offices, the injunction work of the district
court branch and the legal research and special projects office. JEFFREY A. NORRIS AND
MICHAEL J. SHERSHIN, JR., How TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NLRB 31-39 (6th ed. 1992).
For a discussion on the structure of the National Labor Relations Board, see the above
referenced book.
58 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 212, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *1.
59 Id., available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *4.
60 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *6.
580
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charges with the Board as a condition of employment. 61 As such, the General
Counsel found that the agreement deterred employees from seeking to file
charges and thus constituted "an open attack on an employee's right to seek
access to the Board... "62 The General Counsel also noted that the NLRA
"gives the Board the authority to prevent or remedy unfair labor practices,
regardless of any other dispute resolution mechanisms that may be available." 63
Then, in an apparent attempt to reconcile its arguments with the Board's frequent
deferral to the grievance and arbitration procedures in the union setting, the
General Counsel concluded that such use of its discretionary authority would be
the "antithesis of the purpose of the Employer's attempt... to preclude the
Board from exercising its jurisdiction in any manner." 64
Second, the General Counsel essentially argued that it was unclear under
Gilmer whether these agreements were enforceable in contracts of employment.65
Third, the General Counsel found that, because a charge must be filed before
the Board can investigate, any arbitration agreement that might bar an employee
from filing an unfair labor practice charge necessarily interferes with the Board's
jurisdiction. 66
Finally, the General Counsel concluded that the fact that the agreement at
issue stated that the employment relationship was "at will," and that no "just
cause" was required to terminate the employee, the agreement was "illusory"
because the employee did not have a basis upon which to claim the termination
was improper.67 Ultimately, the case was settled before a trial.68
61 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCI-) at 212-13, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *5.62 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCI-) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *9.
63 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997. Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 214, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *13.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCH) at 213, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *13.
6 7 Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum Rep. (CCII) at 214, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *15.
68 In its opinion, the Division of Advice noted that the employer offered to settle the
matter (1) "by agreeing to send a memorandum to all current employees stating that the
arbitration agreement was not meant to prohibit access to the Board"; (2) by including a
clause within the agreement that it was not meant to prohibit access to the Board; (3) by
reinstating Letwin upon his signing of the amended agreement; (4) by paying back pay to
Letwin if Letwin was reinstated and (5) if the settlement included a nonadmission clause.
Bentley's Luggage Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] 24 N.L.R.B. Advice Memorandum
Rep. (CCH) at 212, available at 1995 N.L.R.B. GCM LEXIS, at *4; Accord Reached on
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B. Architectural Building Products, Inc.69
A couple of years after the Bentley's Luggage Corp. case settled, ALJ
Steven Charno held a trial and issued a bench decision holding that Architectural
Building Products, Inc. "violated [s]ections 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the NLRA by
implementing and maintaining a grievance and arbitration provision which
unlawfully restricts the right of its employees to use the Board's processes and
unlawfully conditioning the reinstatement of two employees on their acceptance
of the grievance and arbitration procedure."70 The AUL reached this conclusion,
despite the fact that the language of the arbitration agreement stated that the
agreement was not "a waiver of any requirement of the employee to timely file
any charge with the NLRB" and the fact that the handbook contained a savings
clause that any provision in the policies that were "inconsistent with any statute,
regulation, law or precedent would be deemed to be inoperative and severable."71
The judge based his decision on three aspects of the agreement: (1) that the
agreement was the "'exclusive method of resolution of all disputes;"' (2) that
employees must file any grievance within five days or lose their right to assert a
claim in any forum; and (3) that an employee who asserted his rights to file a
lawsuit or agency proceeding in violation of the agreement would be liable for
reasonable costs, expenses, attorneys' fees, and costs of litigation incurred by the
employer as a result of the employee's suit or proceeding if the employer secures
a stay or dismissal of the action.72 No exceptions were filed to this decision.
C. Exceptional Professional, Inc.73
Less than a month after the Architectural Building Products, Inc. decision
was issued, ALJ Mary Miller Cracraft struck down a mandatory grievance and
arbitration clause contained in an employment application as violative of sections
8(a)(1) and (3), and sections 2(6) and (7) of the NLRA.74 Although the
Unfair Practice Case Involving Mandatory Arbitration Pledge, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
96, at A-11 (May 17, 1996) (discussing the settlement in which the employer was required
to rescind its mandatory policy and reinstate the terminated employee with back pay).
69 Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc., No. 17-CA-19326, 1998 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 541, at
*1 (July 28, 1998).
70 Id. at *4.
71 Id. at *6-7.
72 Id. at *8.
73 Exceptional Prof 1, Inc., Nos. 17-CA-19272, 17-CA-19325, 17-CA-19385, 1998
N.L.R.B. LEXIS 563, at *1 (Aug. 5, 1998).
74 Id. at *72.
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employer, Exceptional Professional, Inc. had providently included a provision
allowing individuals the choice of using the company's grievance and arbitration
procedure or filing a charge with the NLRB or any other agency, the language
of the application also authorized sanctions in the form of reasonable costs,
expenses, and attorneys fees for the improper resort to a court or agency in lieu
of use of the company's procedure. 75
Judge Cracraft acknowledged that no employee had utilized the procedure,
and thus the nature of the agreement, i.e. whether it was voluntary or mandatory,
was uncertain. However, she concluded that the employer, the drafter of the
agreement, must "bear this burden of the ambiguity."76 Although exceptions to
this decision were filed, the Board has not yet issued a decision.
D. Bill's Electric, Inc.77
Approximately a year later, AIJ William L. Schmidt issued his decision in
Bill's Electric, Inc., holding that the company violated Section 8(a)(1)and 8(a)(4)
of the Act by maintaining a grievance and arbitration system requiring employees
and applicants for employment to utilize that system as the exclusive means of
resolving all legal claims against the Company, including claims that would be
filed with the NLRB. ALl Schmidt found that the employer's grievance and
arbitration procedure "tend[ed] to chill employee access to the Board's processes
and would interfere with their statutory right to seek vindication of their rights
at the Board."78
IV. THE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING THE
USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 79
Mandatory arbitration agreements will not be-enforced by the courts unless
the agreement meets certain procedural due process and fairness standards. 80
75 Id. at *56.
76 Id. at *57.
77 Bill's Elec., Inc., Nos. 17-CA-18629-1, 17-CA-18697, 17-CA-18787, 17-CA-19112,
1999 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 572, at *1 (Aug. 10, 1999).
78 Id. at *43--44.
79 This Article does not purport to address all aspects of these agreements. Employers
should tailor their agreements to their particular situation. See Scott S. Moore, Arbitration
of Employment Disputes-Drafting Enforceable Pre-Dispute Agreements, 32 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 1521 (1999).
80 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs, 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Hooters of
Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).
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Given the Board's reluctance to defer to these agreements in situations involving
non-union employees, it is logical to infer that the Board will require these
standards as well. The following are suggested areas in which the employer and
its attorney can modify arbitration agreements to improve the odds that the Board
will defer to the grievance and arbitration procedures and decision in the non-
union setting.
A. No Waiver of Statutory Rights
First, and perhaps most significantly, a mandatory arbitration agreement
should not require that employees waive their statutory right to file an unfair
labor practice claim.81
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court expressly noted that an individual claimant
subject to an arbitration agreement is still free to file a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC, "even though the claimant is not able to institute a private
judicial action."' 82 The Court also concluded that nothing in the agreement
restricted the EEOC's ability to investigate allegations of age discrimination. 83
With respect to the Board's jurisdiction, the Board and the courts have long
held that agreements by private parties cannot restrict the Board's jurisdiction. 84
The Board has specifically noted that the policy of pre-arbitral deferral does not
waive an employee's statutory rights.85
B. Clear, Simple Language
To comply with the principles established by the Board in the Spielberg and
Collyer cases and the subsequent modifications, employers should use simple,
clear language in the arbitration agreement. The language in the agreement
approved by the court in Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs is broad and covers all
81 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483; Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes
Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 753, 791 (1990); Fred W. Batten, Mandatory
Arbitration For Non-Union Employers-Does It Violate the NLRA?, 1997 A.B.A. SEC. OF
LAB. & EMPLOYMENT LAW, MIDWINTER MEETING COMM. PAPERS, at
http://www.abanet.org/LABOR/1997.html.
82 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991).
83 Id. at 28.
84 NLRB v. Walt Disney Prods., 146 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir. 1944); Kinder-Care Learning
Centers, Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1990); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1080
(1955).
85 United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 560 n.17 (1984) ("Nothing in this decision
diminishes the right of employees to seek statutory relief for alleged unfair labor practices.").
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matters directly or indirectly related to recruitment, employment, or termination
of employment.86 Notably, the agreement excludes worker's compensation
claims.
To ameliorate the Board's concerns, an employer can expressly state that
applicants and/or employees are not prohibited from filing a charge of
discrimination with the NLRB. The use of this exclusionary phrase would
eliminate the argument advanced by the General Counsel in Bentley's Luggage
Corp. that employees' rights-to utilize the Board are chilled. Additionally, the
agreement must not impose sanctions, such as costs and attorneys fees, on the
employee for pursuing his right under the NLRA.
C. Employer Pays the Cost of the Arbitrator
Another common objection raised by those who oppose the use of
mandatory arbitration agreements is the.cost of the arbitration proceedings. This
objection should not impose a barrier to approval of these agreements by the
Board as long as the employee is not compelled to pay the cost of arbitration.
Resort to an agency usually involves little or no costs to the charging party. In a
traditional employer-union relationship, the costs of the arbitration are often split
between the company and the union. If employers set up arbitration procedures
that are so expensive that employees are financially unable to proceed, the Board
would have a justification for not deferring to the procedure. Costs cannot be
used by employers to deter the employee from filing a statutory claim.8 7
Chief Judge Edwards noted the following in Cole:
[W]e are unaware of any situation in American jurisprudence in which a
beneficiary of a federal statute has been, required to pay for services of the
judge assigned to hear her or his case. Under Gilmer, arbitration is supposed
to be a reasonable substitute for a judicial forum. Therefore, it would
undermine Congress's intent to prevent employees who are seeking to vindicate
statutory rights from gaining access to a judicial forum and then require them
to pay for the services of an arbitrator when they would never be required to
pay for a judge in court.88
The statutory scheme established in the NLRA and the authority of the
Board would be undermined if employees were unable to exercise their rights
86 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1469.
87 Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding the imposition of a fee-splitting provision effectively denied employee a forum to
vindicate statutory rights).
88 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484.
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because of costs, particularly when one considers the mandate of section 10(a)
of the Act.89
The fact that the employer pays the cost of the arbitrator's fees does not
justify the Board's refusal to defer to the arbitration procedure and arbitrator's
decision unless there is evidence of bias, prejudice, fraud, or illegality.90 Many,
if not most, arbitrators will be appointed from agencies such as the American
Arbitration Association or JAMS. 9 1 Moreover, since the process will be
conducted under the watchful eyes of the Board and the courts, the employer and
arbitrator have a built in deterrent to misconduct.92
D. Procedural Due Process
1. Arbitrators
One of the early criticisms of the Supreme Court in its decisions regarding
arbitration was that "non-lawyer arbitrators" would not have the requisite
knowledge to adequately decide the statutory issues. 93 This issue is not as
persuasive as it once might have been due to the increase in the number of
agencies that provide arbitrators to hear disputes. Many of these agencies, such
as the American Arbitration Association or JAMS, have established criteria to
govern the arbitration process. 94 These agencies often rely on former judges or
attorneys to serve as arbitrators.
89 See supra note 5.
90 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33
(1991); Cole, 105 F.3d at 1486.
91 See Rules 12, 38, and 39 in the National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes (Including Mediation and Arbitration Rules), American Arbitration Association,
at http:llwww.adr.org/rules/employment/employment_rules2.html [hereinafter National
Rules], as well as the TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT,
A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES
ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995), reprinted in DIsp. RESOL. J., Oct.-
Dec. 1995, at 37-39, available at http:lwww/adr.orgleducationleducationlprotocol.html
(May 9, 1995).
92 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485-86; First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
942 (1995) (noting that arbitration awards that are "in manifest disregard of the law" can be
vacated).
93 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 n.18 (1974).
94 See supra note 91.
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2. Discovery
One of the benefits frequently espoused by employers is the ability to reduce
the cost of the process by reducing the cost of discovery. Plaintiff's lawyers, on
the other hand, argue that the individual is hampered by the limitations on
discovery that are often imposed in the arbitration process. The courts have not
found this issue to be a basis for refusing to enforce the agreements.95
Likewise, this argument should not serve as a basis for the Board to refuse
to recognize the validity of a mandatory arbitration agreement. First, this
argument has never limited the Board in its decision to defer to grievance and
arbitration procedures when a union is representing the individual. There is no
support for the proposition that individuals, who are not represented by the
union, would necessarily have less access to documents or witnesses.
-Second, arbitrators should have the authority to issue subpoenas or order the
production of documents, just as in the situation in which employees are
represented by a union.96
Third, currently under the NLRA, parties are not generally afforded the
opportunity to conduct discovery as they are in a traditional civil proceeding.
Although the Board can request that the employer make witnesses or documents
available, the employer can refuse to comply with the request, at which time the
Board must then resort to issuing a subpoena and, if necessary, seek enforcement
of the subpoena in court.
To avoid the use of this argument as a reason for the Board to refuse to defer
to the mandatory arbitration process, companies can rely on the use of rules such
as the National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes prepared by
the American Arbitration Association. 97 These rules provide the arbitrator with
the authority to order such discovery as he or she considers necessary for "a full
and fair exploration of the issues in dispute. 98
3. Remedies
Initially, some companies tried to limit the remedies available to employees
under the arbitration agreement. With respect to statutory claims, this proposition
will not hold up. In Mitsubishi and Gilmer, the Supreme Court specifically noted
the need for the "prospective litigant" to be able to effectively vindicate his
95 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
96 See supra note 91; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
97 See supra note 91.
98 National Rules, supra note 91, at R. 7.
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statutory cause of action. 99 Unless an arbitrator can successfully remedy the
issues before him, the Board will be reluctant to defer to his authority. 1 °
V. CONCLUSION
Whether the Board will ever accept the use of mandatory arbitration
agreements that require employees to submit all disputes to binding arbitration
in the private employment setting in which the employees are not represented by
a union is uncertain. Does the Board have an established process by which it
could allow employers to require that employees resolve disputes through this
process prior to utilizing the Board's resources? Yes. Does the Board have an
established process pursuant to which it could review arbitration decisions to
determine if the proceedings were "fair and regular" and addressed the unfair
labor practice allegations? Yes. Would the decision to, at least initially, defer to
the arbitration proceedings and arbitration decisions in the non-union setting
undermine the Board's authority? No. Will the Board accept the opportunity to
get ahead of the curve? Who knows. Should the Board? Yes. The Board's
authority would not be undermined if it were to apply the principles enunciated
in Spielberg and Collyer Insulated Wire and their progeny. The Board would
always retain the right, pursuant to its statutory mandate, to review the
proceedings and/or the arbitration decision, and, if necessary, issue a complaint
and institute proceedings. In fact, because the Board might take action after the
arbitration, employers will have an incentive to conduct the arbitration in
accordance with the Board's established policies.
Moreover, employees will benefit from this process. Decisions that often
take years to obtain will be reached much sooner and with less likelihood of
appeal due to the nature of the arbitration process.
99 Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
100 Cone Mills Corps, 298 N.L.R.B. 661 (1990); Am. Commercial Lines, Inc., 291
N.L.R.B.1066, 1072-1076 & n.44 (1988); cf. Specialized Distribution Mgmt., Inc., 318
N.L.R.B. 158 (1995).
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